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Rohit Chopra† & Lina M. Khan†† 
A key feature of antitrust today is that the law is developed entirely through 
adjudication. Evidence suggests that this exclusive reliance on adjudication has 
failed to deliver a predictable, efficient, or participatory antitrust regime. Antitrust 
litigation and enforcement are protracted and expensive, requiring extensive discov-
ery and costly expert analysis. In theory, this approach facilitates nuanced and fact-
specific analysis of liability and well-tailored remedies. But in practice, the exclusive 
reliance on case-by-case adjudication has yielded a system of enforcement that gen-
erates ambiguity, drains resources, privileges incumbents, and deprives individuals 
and firms of any real opportunity to participate in the process of creating substantive 
antitrust rules. It is difficult to quantify this harm. 
This Essay argues that rulemaking under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act should supplement antitrust adjudication, and that this institutional shift 
would lower enforcement costs, reduce ambiguity, and facilitate greater democratic 
participation. We build on existing scholarship to debunk the view that the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) does not have competition rulemaking authority pursuant 
to the Administrative Procedure Act conferring Chevron deference, and trace legis-
lative history to underscore how Congress designed the FTC to play a unique insti-
tutional role. 
We close by outlining an initial set of factors that should weigh in favor of 
rulemaking: when there is significant learning from past enforcement and when pri-
vate litigation would be unlikely. Finally, we pose questions in the context of the 
FTC’s recent hearings to prompt further discussion on where this unused tool would 
be most useful. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Open, competitive markets are a foundation of economic lib-
erty. A lack of competition, meanwhile, can enable dominant 
firms to exercise their market power in harmful ways. In uncom-
petitive markets, firms with market power can raise prices for 
consumers, depress wages for workers, and choke off new en-
trants and other upstarts, undermining innovation and business 
dynamism. 
Given these far-reaching effects, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC)’s mandate to promote fair competition is critical. The 
Commission’s recent hearings provided an important opportunity 
for it to reflect on ways to increase the effectiveness of the Com-
mission’s enforcement of the antitrust laws. This is especially im-
portant given that these hearings came against the backdrop of 
concerns about increasing concentration and declining competi-
tion across sectors of the US economy. 
When establishing the FTC over a century ago, Congress 
sought to harness the value of an expert administrative agency to 
collect market data, analyze it rigorously, and use this analysis 
to inform enforcement and policymaking. As the FTC reflects on 
how the agency advances its competition policy and enforcement 
goals, a key aim of this exercise should be to examine its full set 
of tools and authorities—not only those that the Commission has 
traditionally relied upon. 
The Commission should approach this inquiry with three 
goals in mind: 
(1) Reduce ambiguity around what the law is, enhancing  
predictability; 
(2) Reduce the burdens of litigation and enforcement,  
enhancing efficiency; and 
(3) Reduce opacity and certain undemocratic features of  
the current approach, enhancing transparency and  
participation. 
In this Essay, we begin by explaining how the current ap-
proach to antitrust has delivered a regime that generates ambi-
guity, drains resources, and deprives individuals and firms of any 
real opportunity to participate in the process of creating substan-
tive antitrust rules. Second, we explore how the FTC can bolster 
antitrust enforcement through participatory rulemaking. We close 
by identifying two factors to guide when participatory rulemaking 
might be especially apt: in situations where (1) there exists an 
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extensive enforcement record or (2) private litigation is unlikely 
to deter anticompetitive conduct. 
I.  THE STATUS QUO: AMBIGUOUS, BURDENSOME, AND 
UNDEMOCRATIC? 
Antitrust law today is developed exclusively through adjudi-
cation. In theory, this case-by-case approach facilitates nuanced 
and fact-specific analysis of liability and well-tailored remedies. 
But in practice, the reliance on case-by-case adjudication yields a 
system of enforcement that generates ambiguity, unduly drains 
resources from enforcers, and deprives individuals and firms of 
any real opportunity to democratically participate in the process. 
One reason that antitrust adjudication suffers from these 
shortcomings is that courts analyze most forms of conduct under 
the “rule of reason” standard. The “rule of reason” involves a 
broad and open-ended inquiry into the overall competitive effects 
of particular conduct and asks judges to weigh the circumstances 
to decide whether the practice at issue violates the antitrust laws. 
Balancing short-term losses against future predicted gains calls 
for “speculative, possibly labyrinthine, and unnecessary” analysis 
and appears to exceed the abilities of even the most capable insti-
tutional actors.1 Generalist judges struggle to identify anticom-
petitive behavior2 and to apply complex economic criteria in con-
sistent ways.3 Indeed, judges themselves have criticized antitrust 
standards for being highly difficult to administer.4 And if a stand-
ard isn’t administrable, it won’t yield predictable results. The 
dearth of clear standards and rules in antitrust means that mar-
ket actors face uncertainty and cannot internalize legal norms 
 
 1 Richard D. Cudahy and Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 Minn L Rev 59, 87 
(2010). See also Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 
UC Davis L Rev 1375, 1440 (2009). 
 2 C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rule-
making to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 Colum L Rev 629, 674 (2009). 
 3 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 551 US 877, 917 (2007) (Breyer 
dissenting) (“One cannot fairly expect judges and juries in such cases to apply complex 
economic criteria without making a considerable number of mistakes, which themselves 
may impose serious costs.”). 
 4 See, for example, id at 916 (“How easily can courts identify instances in which the 
benefits are likely to outweigh potential harms? My own answer is, not very easily.”); FTC 
v Actavis, 570 US 136, 173 (2013) (Roberts dissenting) (“[T]he majority declares that such 
questions should henceforth be scrutinized by antitrust law’s unruly rule of reason. Good 
luck to the district courts that must, when faced with a patent settlement, weigh the ‘likely 
anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and potentially offsetting legal 
considerations present in the circumstances.’”). 
360 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:357 
 
into their business decisions.5 Moreover, ambiguity deprives mar-
ket participants and the public of notice about what the law is, 
thereby undermining due process—a fundamental principle in 
our legal system.6 
Decades ago, former Commissioner Philip Elman observed that 
case-by-case adjudication “may simply be too slow and cumbersome 
to produce specific and clear standards adequate to the needs of 
businessmen, the private bar, and the government agencies.”7 Re-
lying solely on case-by-case adjudication means that businesses 
and the public must attempt to extract legal rules from a patch-
work of individual court opinions. Because antitrust plaintiffs 
bring cases in dozens of different courts with hundreds of differ-
ent generalist judges and juries, simply understanding what the 
law is can involve piecing together disparate rulings founded on 
unique sets of facts. All too often, the resulting picture is unclear. 
This ambiguity is compounded when the Supreme Court assigns 
to lower courts the task of fleshing out how to structure and apply 
a standard, potentially delaying clarity and certainty for years or 
even decades.8 
The current approach to antitrust also makes enforcement 
highly costly and protracted. In 2012, the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) published the report of a task force that sought to 
“study ways to control the costs of antitrust litigation and enforce-
ment.”9 The task force, the authors explained, was “a response to 
concerns” about both “the costs imposed on businesses by the 
American system of antitrust enforcement” and “the length of 
time required to resolve antitrust issues both in litigation and in 
enforcement proceedings.”10 Out-of-control costs undermine effec-
tive antitrust enforcement by agencies and private litigants, but 
 
 5 Thomas A. Piraino Jr, A New Approach to the Antitrust Analysis of Mergers, 83 
BU L Rev 785, 807 (2003) (arguing that the rule of reason has “become so confusing that 
it preclude[s] antitrust practitioners from advising their clients as to the legality of par-
ticular conduct”). 
 6 See FCC v Fox Television Stations, Inc, 567 US 239, 253 (2012). A lack of fair notice 
raises constitutional due process concerns. As the Supreme Court has explained, fair no-
tice concerns arise when a law or regulation “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelli-
gence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encour-
ages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” Id (citations omitted). 
 7 Philip Elman, The Need for Certainty and Predictability in the Application of the 
Merger Law, 40 NYU L Rev 613, 621 (1965). 
 8 See, for example, Actavis, 570 US at 160 (“We therefore leave to the lower courts 
the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”). 
 9 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Controlling Costs of Antitrust Enforcement and Lit-
igation *1 (ABA, Dec 20, 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/S94N-DWMR. 
 10 Id. 
2020] The Case for “Unfair Methods of Competition” Rulemaking 361 
 
may advantage actors who profit from anticompetitive practices 
and can treat litigation as a routine cost of business. 
Professor Michael Baye and Former Commissioner Joshua 
Wright have noted that generalist judges may be ill-equipped to 
independently analyze and assess evidence presented by eco-
nomic experts.11 Because determining the legality of most conduct 
now involves complex economic analysis, courts have effectively 
“delegate[d] both factfinding and rulemaking to courtroom econo-
mists,” making courtroom economics “not just inevitable but often 
dispositive.”12 In fact, paid expert testimony now is often “the 
‘whole game’ in an antitrust dispute.”13 
Paid experts are a major expense. Some experts charge over 
$1,300 an hour, earning more than senior partners at major law 
firms.14 Over the last decade, expenditures on expert costs by pub-
lic enforcers have ballooned.15 In a system that incentivizes firms 
to spend top dollar on economists who can use ever-increasing 
complexity to spin a favorable tale, the eye-popping costs for eco-
nomic experts can put the government and new market entrants 
at a significant disadvantage.16 
Another component of the burden is that antitrust trials are 
extremely slow and prolonged.17 The Supreme Court has criticized 
antitrust cases for involving “interminable litigation”18 and the 
 
 11 Michael R. Baye and Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for General-
ist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, 54 J L 
& Econ 1, 2 (2011). 
 12 Rebecca Haw, Adversarial Economics in Antitrust Litigation: Losing Academic 
Consensus in the Battle of the Experts, 106 Nw U L Rev 1261, 1263 (2012). 
 13 Id at 1261. 
 14 Jesse Eisinger and Justin Elliott, These Professors Make More Than a Thousand 
Bucks an Hour Peddling Mega-Mergers (ProPublica, Nov 16, 2016), archived at 
https://perma.cc/4DBF-4KGM. 
 15 See, for example, Federal Trade Commission Office of Inspector General, Audit of 
Federal Trade Commission Expert Witness Services *3 (Nov 14, 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/UA8A-2FUS (“During FY 2015 and FY 2016, [The Bureau of Competition] 
obligated an average $9.3 million on expert services and this spending continues to in-
crease. In FY 2017, spending totaled over $10.7 million and approached $14.9 million in 
FY 2018.”). 
 16 The FTC Office of Inspector General identified soaring expert costs as one of the 
two top management challenges facing the Commission in 2019. Federal Trade Commis-
sion Office of Inspector General, Management Challenges Facing the Federal Trade Com-
mission (Sept 27, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/23VE-ETX5. 
 17 See, for example, Kevin Caves and Hal Singer, When the Econometrician Shrugged: 
Identifying and Plugging Gaps in the Consumer Welfare Standard, 26 Geo Mason L Rev 395, 
424 (2019) (“[I]t is unlikely that the slow pace of antitrust enforcement could keep up with 
the fast pace of high-tech markets.”). 
 18 Verizon Communications, Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398, 
414 (2004). 
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“inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase,”19 yielding an 
antitrust system that is “hopelessly beyond effective judicial su-
pervision.”20 That it can easily take a decade to bring an antitrust 
case to full judgment means that by the time a judge orders a 
remedy, market circumstances are likely to have outpaced it.21 
The same 2012 ABA report suggested that lengthy, costly litiga-
tion may be contributing to reduced government-enforcement ef-
forts over time relative to the expansion of the US economy.22 
Lastly, the current approach deprives both the public and 
market participants of any real opportunity to participate in the 
creation of substantive antitrust rules.23 The exclusive reliance on 
case-by-case adjudication leaves broad swaths of market partici-
pants watching from the sidelines, lacking an opportunity to con-
tribute their perspective, their analysis, or their expertise, except 
through one-off amicus briefs.24 Nascent firms and startups are 
especially likely to be left out—despite the vital role they play in 
the competition ecosystem—given that they do not comprise a sig-
nificant portion of the parties represented in litigated matters, 
and they usually lack the resources to engage in amicus activity. 
Furthermore future entrants, whose interests should be carefully 
considered in all aspects of competition law and policy, have no 
voice. 
Firms, entrepreneurs, workers, and consumers across our 
economy vary wildly in their experiences and perspectives on 
 
 19 Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544, 558 (2007). 
 20 Stucke, 42 UC Davis L Rev at 1378 (cited in note 1). 
 21 See, for example, Jonathan M. Jacobson, Tackling the Time and Cost of Antitrust 
Litigation, 32 Antitrust 3 (Fall 2017) (describing a case where the final remedy was issued 
over twenty years after the underlying conduct had taken place, impeding the efficacy of 
the remedy). 
 22 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Controlling Costs at *5 (cited in note 9). 
 23 Courts, policymakers, and scholars have long acknowledged the democratic and 
participatory benefits of rulemaking. See, for example, NLRB v Wyman-Gordon, 394 US 
759, 777–78 (1969) (Douglas dissenting): 
The rule-making procedure performs important functions. It gives notice to an 
entire segment of society of those controls or regimentation that is forthcoming. 
It gives an opportunity for persons affected to be heard. . . . This is a healthy 
process that helps make a society viable. The multiplication of agencies and their 
growing power make them more and more remote from the people affected by 
what they do and make more likely the arbitrary exercise of their powers. Public 
airing of problems through rule making makes the bureaucracy more responsive 
to public needs and is an important brake on the growth of absolutism in the 
regime that now governs all of us. 
 24 For a detailed explanation of how the current antitrust system lacks adequate 
democratic participation or oversight, see generally Harry First and Spencer Weber Waller, 
Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 Fordham L Rev 2543 (2013). 
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market conduct. Enforcement and regulation of business conduct 
can more successfully promote competition when it incorporates 
more voices and evidence from across the marketplace. 
The ambiguity of the laws, the administrative and resource 
burdens of enforcing them, and the exclusivity of the current pro-
cess tend to advantage incumbents and suppress market entry. 
For example, when courts disagree with one another on the legal-
ity of particular conduct, new entrants are likely to eschew the 
practice, since the threat of litigation could prove fatal at an early 
stage. Incumbents, by contrast, will be more likely to conduct a 
cost-benefit analysis of engaging in a potentially unlawful prac-
tice, since they are likely to have higher tolerance for protracted 
litigation and deeper pockets to fund it. Continued ambiguity and 
complexity also create business opportunities for lawyers, econo-
mists, and lobbyists, who effectively profit from the lack of  
clarity. 
II.  THE CASE FOR RULEMAKING UNDER “UNFAIR METHODS OF 
COMPETITION” 
Legislative history is clear that Congress sought to advance 
competition law outside the courts as well as through them.25 Two 
decades into enforcement of the federal antitrust laws, Congress 
was frustrated with the exclusively common law approach to an-
titrust. In particular, lawmakers worried that the case-by-case 
approach to enforcement was yielding a body of law that was in-
consistent, unpredictable, and unmoored from congressional in-
tent.26 The solution, lawmakers decided, was the creation of a new 
expert administrative agency: the Federal Trade Commission. 
Congress established the FTC to supplement the authority of 
the Attorney General.27 While both institutions were tasked with 
enforcing the antitrust laws, lawmakers designed the FTC with 
two distinct features: (1) delegated authority to interpret and pro-
hibit “unfair methods of competition,” as established by § 5 of the 
 
 25 See Appendix. 
 26 Daniel A. Crane, Debunking Humphrey’s Executor, 83 Geo Wash L Rev 1835,  
1859 (2015). 
 27 Daniel A. Crane, The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement 130 (Oxford 
2011) (“The FTC was designed as a complement to, not as a substitute for, the Justice 
Department. The FTC Act’s legislative history evidences a Congressional intent that ‘[f]ar 
from being regarded as a rival of the Justice Department . . . the [FTC] was envisioned as 
an aid to them.’”). 
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Federal Trade Commission Act28 (FTC Act) and (2) extensive au-
thority to collect confidential business information and conduct 
industry studies, as established by § 6(b) of the FTC Act.29 
By designing the Commission this way, Congress sought to 
create a regime where the law developed not just through the ju-
diciary but also through an expert agency. Congress envisioned 
that the Commission’s data collection from market participants 
would ensure that the agency stayed abreast of evolving business 
practices and market trends, and that it would use this expertise 
to establish market-wide standards clarifying what practices con-
stituted an “unfair method of competition,” even as the market 
evolved. This unique role would complement adjudication pur-
sued by the Attorney General, state attorneys general, and pri-
vate parties.30 Indeed, Congress expected that federal judges and 
other policymakers would defer to the Commission on competition 
matters because it would “serve as an indispensable instrument 
of information and publicity, as a clearinghouse for the facts by 
which both the public mind and the managers of great business 
 
 28 15 USC § 45(a). Judicial decisions that have reviewed the legislative history con-
firm that the Commission enjoys flexibility in determining which specific acts or practices 
constitute “unfair methods of competition.” Senator Francis Newlands, the statute’s chief 
sponsor, said that § 5 would “have such an elastic character that it [would] meet every 
new condition and every new practice that may be invented with a view to gradually bring-
ing about monopoly through unfair competition.” Federal Trade Commission Act, 63d 
Cong, 2d Sess in 51 Cong Rec 12024 (July 13, 1914). See also, for example, Atlantic Refin-
ing Co v FTC, 381 US 357, 367 (1965) (“The Congress intentionally left development of the 
term ‘unfair’ to the Commission rather than attempting to define ‘the many and variable 
unfair practices which prevail in commerce . . . .’ In thus divining that there is no limit to 
business ingenuity and legal gymnastics the Congress displayed much foresight.”); FTC v 
Standard Education Society, 86 F2d 692, 696 (2d Cir 1936): 
The Commission has a wide latitude in such matters; its powers are not confined 
to such practices as would be unlawful before it acted; they are more than pro-
cedural; its duty in part at any rate, is to discover and make explicit those unex-
pressed standards of fair dealing which the conscience of the community may 
progressively develop. 
 29 15 USC § 46(b). Section 6(b) of the FTC Act authorizes the Commission to require 
corporations to file informational reports regarding the company’s “organization, business, 
conduct, practices, management, and relation to other corporations.” 
 30 Ahead of the passage of the FTC Act, President Woodrow Wilson explained that 
the Commission could “provide clear rules and direction for business that courts had been 
incapable of providing.” Crane, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at 1859 (cited in note 26), referencing 
Woodrow Wilson, Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Trusts and Monopolies (Amer-
ican Presidency Project, Jan 20, 1914), archived at https://perma.cc/683G-WWVS (“And 
the business men of the country desire something more than that the menace of legal 
process in these matters be made explicit and intelligible. They desire the advice, the def-
inite guidance and information which can be supplied by an administrative body, an in-
terstate trade commission.”). 
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undertakings should be guided.”31 It would, in other words, be 
“unusually expert.”32 
The Commission, at times, has drawn on its expansive infor-
mation collection authorities to follow market trends and estab-
lish expertise on industry practices. For example, in the 1970s the 
FTC ordered over 450 of the country’s largest firms to report cer-
tain financial information. The Commission used this data to 
identify uncompetitive areas of the economy and to guide industry-
wide investigations into potential antitrust violations.33 More re-
cently, the FTC has used this § 6(b) authority to study the busi-
ness practices of patent assertion entities and data brokers, as 
well as the efficacy of the FTC’s merger remedies.34 
As a whole, however, the Commission has fulfilled its man-
date to promote competition by functioning less as an expert 
agency and more as a generalist enforcer and adjudicator.35 This 
is not to say the agency lacks expertise; indeed, the Commission’s 
work with particular markets has provided indispensable in-
sights into the marketplace. But, on competition matters, the 
agency has rarely used this expertise to affirmatively identify 
what conduct or practices constitute an “unfair method of compe-
tition.” Instead, the Commission has sought to define “unfair 
methods of competition” on a case-by-case basis. 
Former Commissioner Wright and Jan Rybnicek have ob-
served that relying exclusively upon adjudication has “thus far 
proved incapable of generating any meaningful guidance as to 
what constitutes an unfair method of competition,” resulting in a 
“boundless standard.”36 They have described this “failure to iden-
tify what precisely comprises an unfair method of competition” as 
 
 31 Crane, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at 1859 (cited in note 26). 
 32 William E. Kovacic, The Quality of Appointments and the Capability of the Federal 
Trade Commission, 49 Admin L Rev 915, 919 (1997). 
 33 Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Economics, Statistical Report: Annual Line 
of Business Report 1977 1–4 (1985). 
 34 Federal Trade Commission, Patent Assertion Entity Activity: An FTC Study (Oct 
2016), archived at https://perma.cc/ACU8-D93N; Federal Trade Commission, Data Bro-
kers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability (May 2014), archived at 
https://perma.cc/R44A-PS2Q; Federal Trade Commission Bureaus of Competition and 
Economics, The FTC’s Merger Remedies 2006–2012: A Report of the Bureaus of Competi-
tion and Economics (Jan 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/5HC5-93SM. 
 35 Crane, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at 1839 (cited in note 26) (“The FTC functions primarily 
by enforcing the antitrust and consumer protection laws as a plaintiff, no more expert than 
the executive branch agencies doing the same thing.”). 
 36 Jan M. Rybnicek and Joshua D. Wright, Defining Section 5 of the FTC Act: The 
Failure of the Common Law Method and the Case for Formal Agency Guidelines, 21 Geo 
Mason L Rev 1287, 1304 (2014). 
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“an unfortunate and persistent black mark on the Commission’s 
record.”37 
We agree that relying solely on adjudication to define the sub-
stance of § 5 has generated persistent ambiguity. However, rely-
ing on courtroom battles to create precedents that set expecta-
tions for the marketplace is not the only vehicle through which 
the Commission can establish what conduct constitutes an “un-
fair method of competition.” The Commission has in its arsenal a 
far more effective tool that would provide greater notice to the 
marketplace and that is developed through a more transparent 
and participatory process: rulemaking. Through engaging in rule-
making, the Commission could define “unfair methods of compe-
tition” through processes established by the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act38 (APA).39 
There is an enormous body of literature on the choice between 
adjudication and rulemaking, and this Essay does not seek to 
fully address the various trade-offs.40 Instead, our goal is to reflect 
on the current state of antitrust enforcement and consider ways 
to address the ambiguity, burdens, and democratic deficiency that 
we discuss above. 
“Rulemaking” often evokes the idea of government imposing 
some inflexible prescription upon the marketplace. This is not 
what we are suggesting. As former Commissioner Elman rightly 
noted, rulemaking can also be related to “standards, guidelines, 
 
 37 Id at 1288. 
 38 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various sections of Title 5. 
 39 We are not the first to suggest that the Commission engage in competition rule-
making. See, for example, Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Anti-
trust Needs a New Deal, 89 Tex L Rev 1247, 1288–89 (2011); Hemphill, 109 Colum L Rev 
at 673–82 (cited in note 2); Justin Hurwitz, Chevron and the Limits of Administrative 
Antitrust, 76 U Pitt L Rev 209, 250–52 (2014); Sandeep Vaheesan, Resurrecting ‘A Com-
prehensive Charter of Economic Liberty’: The Latent Power of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 19 U Pa J Bus L 645, 651–57 (2017). 
 40 The Supreme Court weighed in on the relative benefits and drawbacks of adjudi-
cation and rulemaking in SEC v Chenery Corp, 332 US 194 (1947). For representative 
scholarship, see generally David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in 
the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 Harv L Rev 921 (1965); J. Skelly Wright, The 
Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 Cornell L Rev 375 
(1974); Glen O. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemak-
ing and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U Pa L Rev 485 (1970); 
M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U Chi L Rev 1383 (2004); 
William T. Mayton, The Legislative Resolution of the Rulemaking Versus Adjudication 
Problem in Agency Lawmaking, 1980 Duke L J 103; Richard K. Berg, Re-examining Policy 
Procedures: The Choice Between Rulemaking & Adjudication, 38 Admin L Rev  
149 (1986). 
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pointers, criteria, or presumptions.”41 Rules come from courts, leg-
islative bodies, and agencies. While they were not promulgated as 
agency rules, certain elements of the merger guidelines eventu-
ally came to serve as rules once courts adopted them.42 The mer-
ger guidelines stipulate the analytical framework that the agen-
cies rely on to enforce the merger law. Agency rulemaking could 
do the same for “unfair methods of competition.” 
We see three major benefits to the FTC engaging in rulemak-
ing under “unfair methods of competition,” even if the conduct 
could be condemned under other aspects of antitrust laws. As we 
describe above, the current approach generates ambiguity, is un-
duly burdensome, and suffers from a democratic participation 
deficit. Rulemaking can benefit the marketplace and the public 
on all of these fronts. 
First, rulemaking would enable the Commission to issue 
clear rules to give market participants sufficient notice about 
what the law is, helping ensure that enforcement is predictable.43 
The APA requires agencies engaging in rulemaking to provide the 
public with adequate notice of a proposed rule. The notice must 
include the substance of the rule, the legal authority under which 
the agency has proposed the rule, and the date the rule will come 
into effect.44 An agency must publish the final rule in the Federal 
Register at least thirty days before the rule becomes effective.45 
These procedural requirements promote clear rules and pro-
vide clear notice. As the Supreme Court has stated, a “fundamen-
 
 41 Philip Elman, Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC’s Enforcement of the Merger 
Law, 78 Harv L Rev 385, 385 (1964). 
 42 See generally Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger 
Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 Wm & Mary L Rev 771 (2006). 
 43 Notably, rulemaking would address criticisms that the FTC uses § 5 to extract 
favorable settlements using “strong-arm” tactics without even defining what § 5 is. See 
Hurwitz, 76 U Pitt L Rev at 262 (cited in note 39) (“The FTC has shown an alarming 
willingness in recent years to threaten litigation under Section 5 without feeling the need 
to define its understanding of Section 5’s contours. It has leveraged the uncertain bounds 
of Section 5 to demand extrajudicial settlements from numerous firms, especially in high-
tech industries.”). 
 44 5 USC § 553(b)–(c). The requirement under § 553 to provide the public with ade-
quate notice of a proposed rule is generally achieved through the publication of a notice of 
proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register. The APA requires that the notice of pro-
posed rulemaking include “(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule 
making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; 
and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects 
and issues involved.” 5 USC § 553(b)(1)–(3). 
 45 5 USC § 553(d). 
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tal principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate per-
sons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden 
or required.”46 Clear rules also help deliver consistent enforce-
ment and predictable results. Reducing ambiguity about what the 
law is will enable market participants to channel their resources 
and behavior more productively and will allow market entrants 
and entrepreneurs to compete on more of a level playing field. 
Second, establishing rules could help relieve antitrust en-
forcement of steep costs and prolonged trials. Identifying ex ante 
what types of conduct constitute “unfair method[s] of competition” 
would obviate the need to establish the same exclusively through 
ex post, case-by-case adjudication. Targeting conduct through 
rulemaking, rather than adjudication, would likely lessen the 
burden of expert fees or protracted litigation, potentially saving 
significant resources on a present-value basis.47 
Moreover, establishing a rule through APA rulemaking can 
be faster than litigating multiple cases on a similar subject mat-
ter. For taxpayers and market participants, the present value of 
net benefits through the promulgation of a clear rule that reduces 
the need for litigation is higher than pursuing multiple, pro-
tracted matters through litigation. At the same time, rulemaking 
is not so fast that it surprises market participants. Establishing 
a rule through participatory rulemaking can often be far more ef-
ficient. This is particularly important in the context of declining 
government enforcement relative to economic activity, as docu-
mented by the ABA.48 
And third, rulemaking would enable the Commission to es-
tablish rules through a transparent and participatory process, en-
suring that everyone who may be affected by a new rule has the 
opportunity to weigh in on it, granting the rule greater legiti-
macy.49 APA procedures require that an agency provide the public 
with meaningful opportunity to comment on the rule’s content 
through the submission of written “data, views, or arguments.”50 
 
 46 FCC v Fox Television Stations, 567 US 239, 253 (2012). See also FTC v Colgate 
Palmolive Co, 380 US 374, 392 (1965) (noting that FTC orders “should be clear and precise 
in order that they may be understood by those against whom they are directed”). 
 47 To be sure, the agency may face litigation challenges to the rule itself, though these 
risks can be mitigated through the development of a clear record of empirical evidence. 
 48 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Controlling Costs at *1 (cited in note 9). 
 49 See David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Democracy Index 
Rulemaking, 74 Fordham L Rev 81, 102–03 (2005) (observing that greater public partici-
pation in notice-and-comment rulemaking can generate greater public support for the rule 
that the process ultimately delivers). 
 50 5 USC § 553(c). 
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The agency must then consider and address all submitted com-
ments before issuing the final rule. If an agency adopts a rule with-
out observing these procedures, a court may strike down the rule.51 
This process is far more participatory than adjudication. Un-
like judges, who are confined to the trial record when developing 
precedent-setting rules and standards, the Commission can put 
forth rules after considering a comprehensive set of information 
and analysis.52 Notably, this would also allow the FTC to draw on 
its own informational advantage—namely, its ability to collect 
and aggregate information and to study market trends and indus-
try practices over the long term and outside the context of litiga-
tion.53 Drawing on this expertise to develop rules will help anti-
trust enforcement and policymaking better reflect empirical 
realities and better keep pace with evolving business practices. 
Given that the FTC has largely neglected this tool, some may 
question the Commission’s authority to issue competition rules 
and the legal status these rules would have.54 Indeed, a common 
misconception is that this authority is extremely limited because 
FTC rulemaking is subject to the extensive hurdles posed by the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ments Act55 (“Magnuson-Moss”). In reality, Magnuson-Moss gov-
erns only rulemakings interpreting “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.”56 For rules interpreting “unfair methods of competi-
tion,” the FTC has authority to engage in participatory rulemak-
ing pursuant to the APA. Several antitrust scholars have affirmed 
 
 51 Those affected by the rule may challenge it on several grounds, including it being: 
“(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statu-
tory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without ob-
servance of procedure required by law.” 5 USC § 706(2). 
 52 In adjudication, outside observers may be limited to participation through the fil-
ing of amicus briefs. 
 53 Hemphill, 109 Colum L Rev at 633 (cited in note 2). 
 54 The FTC has issued an antitrust rule only once in its history. Discriminatory Prac-
tices in Men’s and Boys’ Tailored Clothing Industry, 16 CFR Part 412 (1968). This past 
December, however, the FTC issued an announcement that seemed to acknowledge its 
legal authority to do engage in competition rulemaking. See Federal Trade Commission, 
FTC to Hold Workshop on Non-Compete Clauses Used in Employment Contracts (Dec 5, 
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/8ERZ-7HNZ (“Should the FTC consider using its rule-
making authority to address the potential harms of non-compete clauses, applying either 
UMC or UDAP principles?”). 
 55 Pub L No 93-637, 88 Stat 2183 (1975), codified as amended at 15 USC § 2301  
et seq. 
 56 15 USC § 57(a)(1)(A). 
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this authority, and the Appendix lays out further background on 
and discussion of it.57 
Others acknowledge the authority exists but assert that an-
titrust law is ill suited for rulemaking because antitrust is a com-
mon law enterprise. It is true that, as a descriptive matter, anti-
trust enforcement has proceeded almost exclusively through 
adjudication.58 But the idea that this approach is normatively de-
sirable is neither clear nor persuasive. Indeed, relying solely on 
adjudication has certainly not delivered a system with sufficient 
clarity, efficiency, or transparency.59 
Others question how § 5 rulemaking would intersect with ex-
isting Sherman Act jurisprudence, and whether it would conflict 
with or undermine the Justice Department’s authority. Former 
Acting Chair Maureen Ohlhausen, for example, has expressed 
concern that using § 5 to “supplant” the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts could weaken the Justice Department’s hand in some cases 
or create a situation where firms engaged in the same conduct 
would face different liability standards based on which agency 
conducted the investigation.60 
Notably, these concerns are responding to the prospect of ad-
vancing—through adjudication—interpretations of § 5 that go be-
yond the bounds of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. It is less clear 
that these concerns are as salient in the context of § 5 rulemaking 
that interprets “unfair methods of competition” that fall under 
the other antitrust laws.61 Moreover, it is worth noting that the 
FTC Act already contemplates a role for the Attorney General in 
bringing certain claims when authorized to do so by the FTC.62 
We see no reason why the Attorney General could not plead 
counts involving violations of rules proscribing “unfair methods 
 
 57 See, for example, Crane, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at 1862 (cited in note 26); Hurwitz, 
76 U Pitt L Rev at 250–52 (cited in note 39); Vaheesan, 19 U Penn J Bus L at 651–57 (cited 
in note 39). See also Appendix. 
 58 Tim Wu, Antitrust via Rulemaking: Competition Catalysts, 16 Colo Tech L J 33, 
35 (2005) (observing that with several exceptions, the antitrust regime “remains rooted in 
the adjudication model”). 
 59 Notably, other agencies do engage in competition rulemaking. See id at 34–35. 
 60 Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Section 5: Principles of Navigation *12 (Federal Trade 
Commission, July 25, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/4PQ5-NP44. 
 61 This question echoes concerns raised by Commissioner Elman in 1967, when he 
noted that “the Congress of 1914 intended the Commission to supplement, not to duplicate, 
the work of the courts and the Department of Justice in antitrust enforcement.” Philip 
Elman, Antitrust Enforcement: Retrospect and Prospect, 53 ABA J 609, 610 (1967). 
 62 See, for example, 15 USC § 56. 
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of competition” in complaints that follow investigations by the An-
titrust Division for entities that are covered by the Act. 
Here, it is also worth underscoring that claims under the 
Sherman Act are enforceable by private plaintiffs and subject to 
treble damages.63 While private enforcement with treble damages 
is an important element of the antitrust enforcement regime, gen-
eralist judges may be reluctant to condemn certain anticompeti-
tive conduct and impose remedies with very large financial 
awards in close cases. If the Commission promulgates rules under 
§ 5 with respect to anticompetitive conduct, private plaintiffs 
would generally be unable to rely on these rules for the purpose 
of seeking treble damages. This presents an opportunity for the 
Commission to use its analytical and information advantages to 
advance and further develop the law without opening the door to 
treble damages in private suits and prompting judicial reluctance 
to find conduct in violation of the law. 
Lastly, it is worth noting that FTC rulemaking can also be 
used to define what is not an unfair method of competition, which 
may address concerns from some critics about the purported 
boundlessness of the law. 
III.  POTENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS TO GUIDE FTC RULEMAKING 
Rulemaking would advance clarity and certainty about what 
types of conduct constitute—or do not constitute—an “unfair 
method of competition.”64 Commission studies of specific indus-
tries and business practices would guide which practices the FTC 
should use rulemaking to address. Indeed, as an enforcer and reg-
ulator across industries, the Commission is uniquely positioned 
to identify practices that it determines are anticompetitive. Below 
we offer two other considerations that could weigh in favor of FTC 
rulemaking. 
First is the existence of an extensive enforcement record. The 
Commission may have a robust record of agency action against a 
particular anticompetitive practice—yet that enforcement record 
 
 63 15 USC § 15(a) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by 
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue . . . and shall recover threefold 
the damages by him sustained.”). 
 64 It is worth noting again that rulemaking can also serve to provide certainty about 
the bounds of § 5 in a manner that is more durable than FTC Enforcement Policy state-
ments, such as the one adopted by the Commission in 2015. See Federal Trade Commis-
sion, Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” 
Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 80 Fed Reg 57056, 57056 (2015). 
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may not be enough to eliminate the practice altogether, especially 
when the conduct is highly profitable or can evolve in ways that 
do not precisely mirror prior application. Here, rulemaking might 
be a useful tool. 
Investigations of anticompetitive conduct yield significant 
quantitative and qualitative insights about how firms employ cer-
tain practices. In certain situations, these data, supplemented by 
other data collected through a process of public participation, 
might inform the criteria under which a specific practice should 
be deemed anticompetitive. 
For example, in 2002 the FTC published a significant study 
assessing pay-for-delay settlements that impeded generic drug 
entry.65 The agency conducted additional analyses and has pur-
sued a number of cases that were ultimately successful.66 At the 
same time, these settlements have evolved in ways that do not 
replicate the fact patterns previously condemned by courts. This 
has led the FTC to continue to expend significant resources to 
confront these practices in protracted litigation. 
Given the extensive enforcement and factual record devel-
oped by the agency, it is fair to consider whether the FTC might 
have been more effective in targeting pay-for-delay settlements 
through both adjudication and rulemaking, which would have es-
tablished for courts the clear rules by which to evaluate these 
agreements.67 For an agency with scarce resources, it will be im-
portant to carefully analyze whether investing time and effort 
into rulemaking might be a better use of limited resources than 
many years of intense and expensive litigation. 
The second circumstance that could favor FTC rulemaking is 
one in which private litigation is unlikely to discipline anticom-
petitive conduct. Relying on adjudication as a primary way of de-
veloping legal rules and standards is most sensible when there is 
a rich body of disputes. When conduct has anticompetitive impli-
 
 65 Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An 
FTC Study *1 (July 2002), archived at https://perma.cc/A2US-Y8RG. 
 66 See, for example, In the Matter of Impax Laboratories, Inc, FTC Matter 141 0004 
(2019); Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice, Federal Trade Commission v Allergan 
PLC et al, No 17-cv-00312-WHO, *2 (ND Cal filed Feb 22, 2019); Joint Motion for Entry of 
Stipulated Revised Order for Permanent Injunction and Equitable Monetary Relief, Fed-
eral Trade Commission v Cephalon, Inc, No 2:08-cv-2141-MSG, *1–3 (ED Pa filed Feb 19, 
2019). 
 67 Hemphill, 109 Colum L Rev at 673–75 (cited in note 2) (explaining that courts 
have struggled to understand and apply the agency’s deep expertise in this area, while 
rulemaking would likely provide clearer guidance). 
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cations but is unlikely to be challenged by private litigants, adju-
dication is not a reliable means of targeting the anticompetitive 
practice. Here, rulemaking may also be a useful tool. 
Section 5 does not provide for a private right of action. This 
means that actions by the Commission—be it through adjudica-
tion or rulemaking—are the only vehicles for developing legal 
standards under “unfair methods of competition.” Legal issues 
that only the government can pursue are not likely to effectively 
evolve and develop through common law. This is because the body 
of disputes on that issue will be much smaller. For this reason, 
anticompetitive practices that lie beyond the reach of the anti-
trust laws are a particularly good candidate for being the subject 
of rulemaking. 
Anticompetitive practices that are reachable under the other 
antitrust laws but that private litigation is unlikely to target may 
also be ripe for rulemaking. Take, for example, noncompete 
clauses in employment contracts. These agreements prevent em-
ployees from working for rival firms for a period of time after they 
leave. As recent studies show, these agreements—which now 
cover roughly twenty-eight million Americans—deter workers 
from switching employers, weakening workers’ credible threat of 
exit, and diminishing their bargaining power.68 By reducing the 
set of employment options available to workers, employers can 
suppress wages. 
In theory, workers could bring lawsuits alleging that certain 
noncompete clauses are anticompetitive under the Sherman Act. 
In practice, however, private litigation in this area is effectively 
nonexistent. Employers now frequently include in employment 
contracts forced arbitration clauses and class action waivers, pro-
visions that prevent workers from banding together to bring a 
case in court.69 Any challenges must be pursued in isolation and 
through a private arbitrator, whose proceedings lie entirely out-
side the common law system. 
Given the paucity of private litigation challenging noncom-
pete agreements as antitrust violations, the FTC might consider 
 
 68 Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott, and Norman Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor 
Force *17 (U Mich L and Econ Research Paper No 18-013, Aug 30, 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/2UTG-RWCB. 
 69 In 2018, a 5–4 majority of the Supreme Court upheld the validity of class action 
waivers in employment contracts. Epic Systems Corp v Lewis, 138 S Ct 1612, 1632 (2018). 
See also Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration *5 (Economic 
Policy Institute, Sept 27, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/724B-BZDZ (noting that 
roughly sixty million workers are subject to mandatory arbitration terms). 
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engaging in rulemaking on this issue. A rule could grant clarity 
as to when noncompete agreements are permissible or not. Pur-
suing this through rulemaking will allow for a general rule that 
would give notice to a much larger set of market participants than 
addressing noncompetes through adjudication. 
CONCLUSION 
The choice between adjudication and participatory rulemak-
ing is neither strictly binary nor categorical. The Federal Trade 
Commission can pursue each in the appropriate circumstances. 
As the Commission undertakes a period of reflection in a time of 
scarce agency resources, we encourage interested parties to ex-
plore whether and how rulemaking might lead to antitrust policy 
that is more predictable, efficient, and participatory. 
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APPENDIX:  THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S AUTHORITY TO 
DEFINE “UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION” THROUGH 
RULEMAKING 
Rulemaking under “unfair methods of competition” is gov-
erned by the Administrative Procedure Act and is eligible for 
Chevron deference. Given the misunderstanding on this issue, it 
is worth tracing the legal developments around the FTC’s rule-
making authority and understanding how this authority fits with 
the institutional role that Congress intended for the Commission 
to play. 
By passing the Sherman Act, Congress tasked the Justice De-
partment with targeting anticompetitive conduct through pun-
ishing bad acts. Enforcement was to proceed through litigation in 
federal courts, and courts, in turn, soon began introducing their 
own standards, a trend that troubled Congress. A key inflection 
point was Standard Oil Co v United States,70 in which the Su-
preme Court replaced the absolute prohibition on restraints of 
trade with a prohibition on only those restraints found to be “un-
reasonable” in the context of a particular case.71 
The day after the Supreme Court announced its decision, 
members of Congress began recommending new legislation to 
take back power from the courts. Senator Francis Newlands said 
the key issue was whether Congress would allow future admin-
istration of “these great combinations to drift practically into the 
hands of the courts,” subjecting questions about the legality of a 
restraint of trade “to the varying judgments of different courts 
upon the facts and the law.”72 He introduced two bills providing 
for the federal registration of corporations, creating an interstate 
trade commission, and introducing “an elastic concept of unfair-
ness.”73 The bills also authorized the Commission to “revoke and 
cancel the registration of any corporation” upon a finding of vio-
lation of any operative judicial decree rendered under the Sherman 
Act, or upon the use of “materially unfair or oppressive methods 
of competition.”74 
While neither bill became law, the effort led Congress to hold 
hearings on the need for new antitrust law. After three months of 
 
 70 221 US 1 (1911). 
 71 Id at 53–55, 64. 
 72 62d Cong, 1st Sess in 47 Cong Rec 1225 (May 16, 1911). 
 73 Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of Competition” in Section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 BC L Rev 227, 231 (1980). 
 74 Id, quoting 62d Cong, 1st Sess in 47 Cong Rec 2619–20 (1911) (cited in note 72). 
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testimony, the Committee issued the “Cummins Report.”75 Echo-
ing Senator Newlands’s view, the report criticized the Standard 
Oil decision, noting that “whenever the rule [of reason] is invoked 
the court does not administer the law, but makes the law.”76 The 
report stated that it was “inconceivable that in a country gov-
erned by a written Constitution and statute law the courts can be 
permitted to test each restraint of trade by the economic standard 
which the individual members of the court may happen to ap-
prove.”77 This approach, they noted, did not create adequate pre-
dictability or uniformity of outcomes.78 The weaknesses in the cur-
rent system, the report concluded, called for new legislation 
“establishing a commission for the better administration of the 
law and to aid in its enforcement.”79 
This set the scene for the creation of the Federal Trade Com-
mission. Most notably, the authorizing statute declared “unfair 
methods of competition” in commerce unlawful. The committee 
report explained the reason for including such a broad term: 
The committee gave careful consideration to the question as 
to whether it would attempt to define the many and variable 
unfair practices which prevail in commerce and to forbid 
[them] or whether it would, by a general declaration con-
demning unfair practices, leave it to the commission to deter-
mine what practices were unfair. It concluded that the latter 
course would be the better, for the reason . . . that there were 
too many unfair practices to define, and after writing 20 of 
them into the law it would be quite possible to invent others.80 
In other words, Congress would leave it up to the new Com-
mission to define and identify practices that constituted “unfair 
 
 75 Control of Corporations, Persons, and Firms Engaged in Interstate Commerce, S 
Rep No 1326, 62d Cong, 3d Sess 1 (1913) (Cummins Report). 
 76 Id at 10. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id at 12. The report stated: 
There are many forms of combination, and many practices in business which 
have been so unequivocally condemned by the Supreme Court that as to them 
and their like the statute is so clear that no person can be in any doubt respect-
ing what is lawful and what is unlawful; but as the statute is now construed 
there are . . . many other practices that seriously interfere with competition, and 
are plainly opposed to the public welfare, concerning which it is impossible to 
predict with any certainty whether they will be held to be due or undue re-
straints of trade. 
 79 Cummins Report, 62d Cong, 3d Sess at 12 (cited in note 75). 
 80 Federal Trade Commission, S Rep No 597, 63d Cong, 2d Sess 13 (1914). 
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methods of competition.” Indeed, the FTC would be especially 
suited to this task, given that Congress was designing the agency 
to gather and develop expertise in business practices and indus-
try trends.81 
These aspects of the FTC’s design reflect Congress’s intention 
for the new agency to alter the institutional structure of antitrust 
enforcement. By passing the Sherman Act, Congress had adopted 
a crime-tort model—which prohibited certain bad acts—rather 
than a corporate-regulatory model, which would have created a 
regulatory regime for policing the capital-concentrating effects of 
incorporation laws.82 By creating the Federal Trade Commission, 
Congress was adopting an expert-agency model alongside the 
crime-tort model. A key aim was for legislators to recover power 
to steer antitrust law back from the courts. As Senator Albert 
Cummins expressed, “I would rather take my chance with a com-
mission at all times under the power of Congress, at all times un-
der the eye of the people . . . than . . . upon the abstract proposi-
tions, even though they be full of importance, argued in the 
comparative seclusion of the courts.”83 
In order to equip the FTC to fulfill this institutional mission, 
Congress endowed the Commission with the authority to “make 
rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the [FTC 
Act’s] provisions.”84 In the parlance of Chevron, this means “Con-
gress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules 
carrying the force of law,” and agency interpretations made pur-
suant to that authority fall within the domain of Chevron.85 In 
light of confusion around whether “unfair methods of competi-
tion” applied only to practices that harmed competitors, Congress 
 
 81 FTC v R.F. Keppel & Brothers, Inc, 291 US 304, 314 (1934): 
[The FTC] was created with the avowed purpose of lodging the administrative 
functions committed to it in a ‘body specially competent to deal with them by 
reason of information, experience and careful study of the business and economic 
conditions of the industry affected,’ and it was organized in such a manner, with 
respect to the length and expiration of the terms of office of its members, as 
would ‘give to them an opportunity to acquire the expertness in dealing with 
these special questions concerning industry that comes from experience. 
 82 See Daniel A. Crane, The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement 13  
(Oxford 2011); Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 Cal L Rev 1, 2 (2008). 
 83 Federal Trade Commission, 63d Cong, 3d Sess, in 51 Cong Rec 13047 (1914). 
 84 15 USC § 46(g). 
 85 United States v Mead, 533 US 218, 234–35 (2001). 
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in 1938 passed the Wheeler-Lea Amendment,86 adding the pro-
scription against “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”87 
In 1973, the DC Circuit clarified that the FTC did, indeed, 
have the authority to promulgate substantive rules, not just pro-
cedural ones.88 The court observed that the “use of substantive 
rule-making is increasingly felt to yield significant benefits to 
those the agency regulates” and that “[i]ncreasingly, courts are 
recognizing that use of rule-making to make innovations in 
agency policy may actually be fairer to regulated parties than to-
tal reliance on case-by-case adjudication.”89 
Two years later, Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act. The law 
granted the Commission authority to promulgate industry-wide 
rules prohibiting “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” and intro-
duced heightened procedural requirements for rulemaking made 
under that provision. Legislative history documents that a House 
proposal would have subjected all FTC rulemaking to the new 
procedures, but that this version of the bill was rejected for one 
that spoke only to “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”90 The 
final statute contains a provision limiting its effect to “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices,”91 and the conference report, too, 
states that the legislation “does not affect any authority of the 
FTC under existing law to prescribe rules with respect to unfair 
methods of competition.”92 
In 1980, Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission Im-
provements Act,93 which added procedural requirements to rule-
making governed by Magnuson-Moss and stripped the FTC of 
rulemaking authority on specific issues. The 1980 Amendments, 
like the 1975 Act, applied only to the FTC’s authority over “unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices.” The Commission’s “unfair methods 
of competition” rulemaking authority was not subjected to the 
 
 86 52 Stat 111, codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 41–58. 
 87 15 USC § 45. 
 88 See National Petroleum Refiners Association v FTC, 482 F2d 672, 698 (1973) (“We 
hold that under the terms of its governing statute, 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq., and under Sec-
tion 6(g), 15 U.S.C. § 46(g), in particular, the Federal Trade Commission is authorized to 
promulgate rules defining the meaning of the statutory standards of the illegality the 
Commission is empowered to prevent.”). 
 89 Id at 681. 
 90 Hurwitz, 76 U Pitt L Rev at 234 (cited in note 39). 
 91 15 USC § 57. 
 92 Hurwitz, 76 U Pitt L Rev at 234–35 (cited in note 39) (citations omitted). 
 93 Pub L No 96-252, 94 Stat 374 (1980), codified as amended at 15 USC § 57. 
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new procedures. It remains governed by the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, and FTC interpretations of “unfair methods of compe-
tition” are subject to Chevron deference. 
 
